How Ayatollah Khamenei's literary corpus reveals a half-century of Islamic intellectual thought. By Humaira Ahad.

 How Ayatollah Khamenei's literary corpus reveals a half-century of Islamic intellectual thought.

By Humaira Ahad.                 Press.tv.ir. Monday, 13 July 2026 10:12.

In this very good bibliography of SeyyedAli Khamenei, we just undelined the most important parts.

«Across the bookshops lining Tehran's Enghelab Square, the works of the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Seyyed Ali Khamenei, occupy a special and distinctive place.

Slim paperbacks stand alongside multi-volume Qur'anic commentaries, collections of sermons, lecture transcripts, memoirs, translations, and speeches delivered across several decades.

To a casual visitor, they appear to be separate publications produced for different audiences and occasions. Read together, however, they reveal a coherent intellectual project developed over more than half a century.

Long before he was elected Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khamenei had established himself as a preacher, lecturer, translator, and student of Islamic thought.

Many of the books that now bear his name did not begin as books. Some originated as lectures delivered in the mosques of the holy city of Mashhad during the final years of the Western-backed rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Others emerged from Qur'anic exegesis, addresses to university students, speeches to government officials, or public statements issued after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Taken individually, these works span a wide range of subjects: Qur'anic interpretation, Shi'a history, ethics, governance, the question of Palestine, revolutionary thought, personal memoir, and contemporary political affairs.

Yet a common thread runs through them. Rather than treating religion as separate from politics, or spirituality as detached from society, Imam Khamenei consistently stated that faith, justice, history, and political responsibility are inseparable dimensions of Islamic life.

Across dozens of volumes, the same fundamental questions recur with remarkable consistency. What responsibilities accompany religious leadership? How should Muslims respond to injustice and foreign domination? What lessons do the lives of the Prophets and the Shi'a Imams hold for contemporary society? How should an Islamic government balance moral authority with political power?

Although the historical settings shift from one work to another, these questions provide the connective tissue binding together Imam Khamenei's published corpus. This intellectual trajectory becomes especially apparent when the works are read chronologically.

His earliest lectures, delivered before the Islamic Revolution, emphasize the moral and social dimensions of Islam under Western-backed monarchical rule. Later works increasingly grapple with the practical challenges of governance, statecraft, international affairs, and the responsibilities of an Islamic government.

While the political context evolves, from opposition activism to national leadership, the underlying intellectual framework remains strikingly consistent.

The General Outline of Islamic Thought

Among the earliest and most influential works of the martyred Leader is The General Outline of Islamic Thought, a volume compiled from a series of Ramadan lectures delivered in the holy city of Mashhad in 1974.

The lectures were delivered during a period of growing political and religious ferment in Iran, during the Pahlavi dictatorship, when discussions of Islam increasingly intersected with debates over justice, authority, and social change.

Rather than approaching religion primarily through theology or jurisprudence, Imam Khamenei organized the series around foundational Qur'anic concepts, including faith (iman), divine unity (tawḥid), prophethood (nubuwwah), and guardianship (wilayah), arguing that each carries both spiritual and social significance.

A central theme runs throughout the work: Islam cannot be understood merely as a private system of belief or ritual observance. Instead, the martyred Leader presents it as a comprehensive framework governing individual conduct, communal responsibility, and public life.

In this reading, faith is expressed not only through personal devotion but also through active engagement with questions of justice, social responsibility, and collective action.

Many of the ideas that would later recur throughout Imam Khamenei's writings are already evident in these early lectures. The inseparability of belief and action, the unity of religious and political life, and the role of Islamic teachings in shaping society emerge as interconnected principles rather than discrete themes.

Although delivered to a local audience more than five decades ago, the lectures remain foundational within Imam Khamenei's broader body of work, laying out the conceptual framework that would continue to inform many of his later writings.

The 250-Year-Old Human

If The General Outline of Islamic Thought establishes the martyred Leader's understanding of Islam as a comprehensive worldview, The 250-Year-Old Human applies that framework to history.

The book's central premise is straightforward. Rather than treating each of the Twelve Shi'a Imams as an independent historical figure pursuing distinct objectives, Imam Khamenei argues that they should be understood as participants in a single, continuous movement spanning approximately 250 years.

Their differing approaches, whether political activism, scholarship, patience, or resistance, are presented not as contradictions but as responses to changing historical circumstances in pursuit of a common mission.

The second volume of the book traces this narrative from the period following the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) through the successive Imams, portraying their lives as interconnected chapters in a unified historical project.

Throughout, it emphasizes themes of perseverance, sacrifice, principled leadership, and the preservation of authentic Islam during periods of political repression and ideological challenge.

This interpretation reflects a broader pattern visible throughout Imam Khamenei's writings. History is not presented as a sequence of disconnected events but as a continuous source of insight into contemporary religious and political questions. Past struggles are interpreted as enduring reservoirs of ethical guidance and strategic lessons for later generations.

The third volume of the book develops the same historical framework in considerably greater depth. Expanding upon the arguments introduced earlier, it examines more closely the political, social, and cultural circumstances surrounding each Imam while offering a more detailed analysis of the intellectual continuity linking their lives and missions.

Rather than serving as an introductory survey, the volume presents a more analytical account of the period. Its expanded treatment affords greater attention to historical context and further illustrates Imam Khamenei's broader method of interpreting Islamic history.

Individuals are understood within larger historical movements; seemingly isolated events become part of long-term historical processes, and religious leadership is examined through the interplay of moral principle and political circumstance.

Read alongside The General Outline of Islamic Thought, The 250-Year-Old Human demonstrates the consistency of Imam Khamenei's intellectual approach, bringing scripture, history, ethics, and governance into a single interpretive framework.

Imam Hasan's Peace Treaty: The Most Magnificent Heroic Flexibility in History.

The book opens with a question that has echoed through centuries of Islamic scholarship: if Imam Hassan (AS) chose peace, why did Imam Hussain (AS) choose resistance at Karbala? Were the two brothers pursuing different paths, or the same objective through different means?

Confronted with widespread misunderstandings surrounding Imam Hassan's (AS) treaty with Mu'awiyah, Imam Khamenei initially set out in 1969 to write an analytical study of his own.

During his research, however, he encountered Sulh al-Hasan by Sheikh Razi Al Yasin. Convinced that the work already provided the comprehensive analysis he had intended to produce, he instead undertook its translation into Persian.

That decision reflected both the martyred Leader's scholarly judgment and literary craftsmanship. Drawing on his command of Arabic and deep knowledge of Islamic history, he produced a translation distinguished by its clarity, precision, and readability, making a complex and often misunderstood episode of early Islamic history accessible to a wider readership.

The book challenges the common assumption that Imam Hassan's (AS) peace treaty and Imam Hussain's (AS) uprising represent opposing philosophies. Instead, it argues that both were guided by the same overarching mission, with their differing responses shaped by the political realities of their respective eras.

Imam Hassan's (AS) treaty is thus presented not as a retreat, but as an act of strategic wisdom, what the book famously describes as "the most magnificent heroic flexibility in history." In doing so, it offers a carefully reasoned reappraisal of one of the defining turning points in early Islamic history.

‘Hikayat al-Sayyed’: Book chronicling Imam Khamenei’s formative years unveiled in Tehran

In a solemn ceremony held Thursday evening at the martyrdom site of the late Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Arabic translation of the acclaimed work "Agha

Two Striving Imams

Based on six lectures delivered in 1972 and 1973, Two Striving Imams returns to a central question in Islamic history: if Imam Hassan (AS) concluded a peace treaty while Imam Hussain (AS) launched an uprising, were their approaches fundamentally different? Imam Sayyed Ali Khamenei argues that they were not.

According to his analysis, both Imams pursued the same overarching mission, adapting their methods to the demands of their respective historical circumstances. The lectures, delivered at Tehran's Hosseiniyeh Ershad and during Tasu'a, Ashura, and Sham-e Ghariban at Masjid-e Karamat in the holy city of Mashhad, examine the distinct political and social conditions confronting each Imam before arriving at a unified interpretation of their actions.

The concluding chapter examines and critiques three common interpretations of the Karbala movement before presenting Imam Khamenei's own conclusion: that Imam Hussain's (AS) uprising represented the continuation and revival of the Prophet Muhammad's (peace be upon him) transformative mission, offering an enduring model for confronting tyranny and injustice.

Written in the passionate yet accessible style that characterized his early public lectures, Two Striving Imams remains one of Imam Khamenei's most engaging works, particularly for younger readers approaching Islamic history through the lens of ideas, principles, and historical purpose rather than chronology alone.

The Sun on the Battlefield: The Ashura Uprising in the Words of Imam Sayyed Ali Khamenei

Spanning more than three decades of speeches and reflections, from 1979 to 2011, the volume brings together Imam Khamenei's observations on Ashura in six thematic sections.

These explore the personality of Imam Hussain (AS), the events of Karbala, the companions and adversaries of Ashura, and the prayers and ziyarat (pilgrimage supplications) associated with its commemoration.

The book's organization reflects a practical purpose. Rather than requiring readers to proceed sequentially, its thematic structure allows each subject to be studied independently, making the volume equally valuable for sustained reading and scholarly reference.

Running throughout the collection is a recurring image: Ashura as an ocean whose depths can never be exhausted. The more closely its events are examined, the richer their meanings become.

This sense of inexhaustible reflection gives the book its enduring appeal for researchers, students of Islamic history, and readers seeking a deeper understanding of one of the defining moments of the Islamic tradition.

Yet the story does not end at Karbala. In another work, Imam Khamenei turns to the years that followed, exploring how the legacy of Ashura continued to shape the course of Islamic history.

The Epic of Imam Sajjad (AS): The Life and Struggle of Imam Sajjad (AS)

The Fourth Shi'a Imam is often remembered for the profound supplications preserved in Al-Sahifa al-Sajjadiyya. Yet Imam Khamenei invites readers to look beyond its devotional dimension. Were these prayers simply the expressions of a leader withdrawn from public life, or did they serve a broader historical purpose?

Drawing on a carefully curated collection of lectures, the book portrays Imam Sajjad's (AS) leadership during the Umayyad period as a sophisticated synthesis of spiritual guidance, intellectual renewal, and patient institution-building.

Through education, the cultivation of committed followers, and the preservation of authentic Islamic teachings, Imam Sajjad (AS) is presented as rebuilding the foundations of the Shi'a community in the aftermath of Karbala.

In this reading, his legacy extends beyond piety alone: his quiet but deliberate efforts prepared the intellectual and moral ground upon which future generations would continue the mission of the Ahl al-Bayt (the holy household).

Palestine: A Century of Conflict Through Imam Sayyed Ali Khamenei's Perspective

For Imam Khamenei, the question of Palestine has never been confined to diplomacy or geopolitics. Throughout his writings and speeches, it is presented as a moral issue, one that has transcended the borders of West Asia to become a humanitarian concern shared by people of conscience around the world.

Palestine brings together decades of his reflections on an issue that has shaped modern history. Drawing on speeches delivered over many years, the volume traces nearly a century of developments, examining the historical evolution of Palestine under Israeli occupation and apartheid, the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement, and the continuing struggle for justice and self-determination.

Rather than treating Palestine solely as a political dispute, Imam Khamenei frames it as a question of historical memory, human dignity, and moral responsibility. The result is a work that seeks not only to explain how the occupation and extermination developed, but also why it continues to occupy such a central place in contemporary Islamic thought and political discourse.

Translated into Arabic, English, Urdu, and Kurdish, the book serves as an accessible introduction for readers seeking to understand both the historical background of the Palestinian question and the ideas that shape Imam Khamenei's perspective on it.

Commentary on Nahj al-Balagha, Bringing Imam Ali's Words Into the Modern Age

For Imam Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Nahj al-Balagha, the celebrated collection of sermons, letters, and sayings attributed to Imam Ali (AS), has always been more than a literary or historical masterpiece. He has consistently described it as a living source of guidance for individual conduct, ethical leadership, and the ordering of society.

Since the 1960s, introducing the teachings of Imam Ali (AS) to contemporary audiences has been one of his enduring intellectual pursuits. He has repeatedly presented Nahj al-Balagha as a foundational text for understanding the principles of the Islamic Revolution, encouraging both public officials and younger generations to engage with it through careful study and reflection.

Rather than confining himself to textual commentary, Imam Khamenei combines close reading with translation, linguistic clarification, and reflections on the ethical, political, and spiritual insights embedded in Imam Ali's (AS) words.

This long engagement has been preserved in four published volumes. The Clear Path for Leaders explores principles of governance through a series of Ramadan lectures delivered to members of the Iranian cabinet.

The Charter of Alid Governance examines seven lectures delivered in Mashhad in 1973 and 1974, emphasizing justice, resistance to oppression, and social responsibility. Prophethood in Nahj al-Balagha, based on lectures delivered in 1982, turns to the aims of divine prophethood and the practical role of Nahj al-Balagha in shaping society.

The fourth volume, An Endless Treasury, reflects on the enduring significance of the text and its place within Islamic civilization.

Taken together, these four volumes represent decades of sustained engagement with one of Islam's most influential works, illustrating Imam Khamenei's enduring effort to connect the teachings of Imam Ali (AS) with the ethical, social, and political questions of the modern world.

English edition of Leader’s book ‘Islamic Governance’ set for worldwide release

Published by Sydney-based Lantern Publications, the English edition of ‘Islamic Governance’, a seminal book authored by Sayyed Ali Khamenei, is slated for worldwide release on Ghadir

Bayan al-Qur'an: Reading the Qur'an as a Living Guide

For Imam Khamenei, the Qur'an was never simply a sacred text to be admired; it was a guide meant to shape individual character, social life, and the conduct of society.

That conviction runs throughout the ten-volume Bayan al-Qur'an series. Each volume is devoted to a single surah, offering commentary that seeks to connect Qur'anic teachings with the practical realities confronting individuals and communities.

The series includes commentaries on Surahs At-Taghabun, Al-Mujadilah, Al-Mumtahanah, Al-Jumu'ah, Al-Hashr, Al-Fatihah, Al-Baqarah, At-Tawbah (Bara'ah), Al-Munafiqun, and As-Saff.

One of the defining features of the collection is its accessibility. Complex theological and ethical ideas are presented in clear, accessible language, making the volumes approachable for general readers while offering sufficient depth for students of Islamic studies and academic researchers.

Throughout the series, Qur'anic interpretation is presented not as an abstract scholarly exercise but as a means of understanding the moral, social, and political challenges of contemporary life. In doing so, Bayan al-Qur'an reflects a consistent theme running through Imam Khamenei's broader body of work: the Qur'an is to be studied not only for contemplation, but also as a living guide for thought and action.

Hadith of Life: Ethics for Everyday Living

For Imam Khamenei, every lesson began with character.

Following a tradition inherited from many of his own teachers, he would open his classes with a brief ethical reflection, often based on a saying of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) or one of the Shi'a Imams.

Those reflections were later compiled into the five-volume Hadith of Life series.

Drawing primarily on classical Shi'a sources, including Makarim al-Akhlaq, Al-Nawadir, Amali al-Saduq, Bihar al-Anwar, and Al-Khisal, the collection explores themes of moral refinement, self-discipline, spiritual growth, and the cultivation of virtuous character.

Rather than presenting ethical teachings as abstract ideals, Imam Khamenei explains them in language that is clear, practical, and readily applicable to everyday life. The emphasis is not merely on understanding moral principles, but on putting them into practice.

Accessible to readers of all ages, Hadith of Life also serves as a valuable resource for seminarians, teachers, and religious educators. In many ways, the series reflects a defining feature of Imam Khamenei's broader body of work: the conviction that knowledge acquires its fullest meaning only when it shapes character and conduct.

English audiobook of Ayatollah Khamenei’s memoirs unveiled on sidelines of 34th intl. book fair

The audiobook of the English edition of Leader of Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s autobiography and memoirs titled Cell No.14 was unveiled at the 34th Tehran International Book Fair.

 

Justice: Turning an Ideal Into Practice

In Justice, Imam Khamenei moves beyond philosophical discussion to examine how justice can be pursued in the practical realities of social and political life.

Organized around four central questions, including why justice matters, what is required to establish it, how it should be pursued, and what challenges accompany that pursuit, the book draws on his speeches and writings to encourage careful reflection rather than abstract debate.

Structured almost as a workshop in civic and ethical thought, the volume is aimed particularly at student organizations, social activists, and readers interested in questions of public responsibility and social reform.

Throughout, the emphasis remains on translating principle into practice. Rather than treating justice as an abstract ideal, the book invites readers to consider the moral, intellectual, and practical responsibilities involved in making it a lived reality.

The Blood of the Heart Became a Ruby: A Life Told in the Author's Own Words

In The Blood of the Heart Became a Ruby, Imam Khamenei recounts his own journey through the turbulent years leading up to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Originally written in Arabic under the title Inna Ma'a al-Sabri Nasran (Indeed, with Patience Comes Victory), the work was later translated into Persian and subsequently into several other languages, including English, Spanish, and Chinese.

Its pages trace years marked by imprisonment, hardship, perseverance, and political struggle, while also reflecting on the martyred Leader's formative years as a seminary student and the experiences that shaped his intellectual and religious outlook.

Introducing the book in Beirut, the martyred Secretary-General of the Hezbollah Resistance Movement, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, remarked that he had read it in a single night, describing it as a work that would greatly enrich anyone seeking to understand the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution, particularly younger readers.

Yet the autobiography is more than a personal memoir. Through Imam Khamenei's recollections, readers gain a vivid portrait of the social, cultural, and political atmosphere of pre-revolutionary Iran, making the story of one individual inseparable from the story of an era.

Taken individually, these works explore scripture, history, ethics, governance, memoir, and international affairs. Read together, however, they reveal a sustained intellectual project developed over more than half a century, in which recurring questions of faith, justice, leadership, and resistance are examined from different perspectives and in changing historical circumstances.

Whether approached as religious scholarship, political thought, historical interpretation, or personal reflection, Imam Khamenei's books offer readers a window into the ideas that have shaped one of the most influential political and religious figures in contemporary Iran.

More than a collection of individual titles, they form a coherent body of work that traces the evolution of an intellectual vision from the lecture halls and mosques of pre-revolutionary Iran to the responsibilities of national leadership.»

No 490º aniversário da morte de Erasmo. A perenidade da sua vida e obra. Carta sobre as qualidades dos governantes, o valor da história crítica, e o elogio dos livros

Pequeno oratório erasmiano em Lisboa, com um rosário ou mala jaina e um cálice persa

     Nesta terceira década do século XXI, celebrando-se já quase o quinto centenário da morte de Erasmo, daquele sobre quem André de Resende escreveu a Damião de Goes, que com Erasmo chegara a viver, dando-lhe conta de uma voz que ouvira em sonho: «extinguiu-se para o mundo aquele que era o ornamento que os séculos nunca chorarão suficiente», o que deveremos relembrar do seu ser, vida e obra como sendo o mais perene?

O moralista, o satírico e irónico, o exegeta classicista e cristão, o reformista, , o filólogo e retórico, o pedagogo das crianças e dos príncipes,  o dialogante instrutivo dos Colóquios, o amigo dos livros e dos impressores, autor de best-sellers em edições de bolso, o polemista, o epistológrafo, o guia da intelectualidade cristã, o ecuménico, o conciliador, o conselheiro de príncipes, governantes, papas e altos eclesiásticos, o filósofo, o tradutor, anotador e parafraseador dos Evangelhos,  o teólogo renovador do Cristianismo essencial, o escritor independente, sem partidos, o mestre do Humanismo europeu, o irenista ou propugnador da pax universalis? 

Como humanista, sintetizador ou unificador da sabedoria pagã ou greco-romana e a cristã, recolhendo tanta sabedoria popular dos provérbios e tanta clássica dos exemplos, lucidamente observando e criticando a sua época, o que devemos mais realçar como conceitos, valores, princípios que nos possam inspirar e guiar?

O Logos ou inteligência, intelecto activo, palavra, verbo, sermo, ordem, tão trabalhado pelo estoicos com o logos spermatikoi  que permeia o mundo e que ele tanto sentiu nas suas investigações e intuições, ou com os confabulators mais próximos?

O Corpo místico da Igreja, de Cristo e da Humanidade que a todos envolve e  que todos pertencemos, subcampo da alma do mundo e no qual colaboramos com a nossa devoção, trabalho, amor e criatividade?

O valor da vida simples e sincera, da justiça distributiva eficaz e alargada, a critica dos poderosos, arrogantes, pedantes, opressores... 

O defensor do livre arbítrio, como exemplificou na polémica com a predestinação de Lutero, certamente condicionado pela hereditariedade, o ambiente e a educação mas numa vida  que apela à nossa liberdade interior e responsabilidade de sabermos escolher o melhor possível.

A demanda da verdade e a recusa da mentira, o elogio do bem e a crítica do erro, como ele corajosamente praticou toda a sua vida, sendo por isso tão atacado e censurado, mas perseverando nos seus trabalhos e edições e nas suas cartas, que tanta gente inspiravam e guiavam, sobrevivendo hoje cerca de 3.000, publicadas por Allen e pela Toronto University Press e das quais publicamos algumas traduções e excertos no blogue.

Talvez seja transcrevendo uma carta sua a melhor formas de apresentarmos alguns dos seus valores, e concluir esta breve homenagem a um amigo e mestre querido, com quem convivi bastante alguns anos (e que me fez subitamente intuir hoje que era o seu dia), publicando um seu livro, Modo de Orar a Deus, e peregrinando ao local em que está a sua lápide da entrada na imortalidade, e nos quais dialoguei bastante com José V. de Pina Martins, um moreano e erasmiano de valor internacional. Assim, traduzimos um excerto duma sua carta de  actualidade perene quanto à formação humanista dos dirigentes e das pessoas, quanto ao valor da História escrita como elogiadora ou condenadora dos governantes e quanto ao amor e leitura dos livros, sobretudo porque a manipulação e imbecilização das populações parece ser desejada e implementada pela UE e a oligarquia mundial: 

Carta 586 na Opus Epistolarum de Allen, e na tradução de Marcel A. Nauwelaerts.   Antuérpia, 5 de Junho de 1517. 

«Ó Frederico e Jorge [duque da Saxónia], duques incorruptíssimos, tal como eu não exigiria dos homens, que uma decisão da Fortuna colocou ao leme do mundo um conhecimento preciso e exacto das disciplinas eclesiásticas, onde vemos que aqueles que envelheceram, longe de estarem capazes de segurar as rédeas do governo, falta-lhes mesmo o senso comum, de igual modo  afasto-me resolutamente dos que desviam os reis e governantes, como se fosse algo nocivo, de toda a relação com os livros, como se o que é verdadeiramente real consistisse em pouco saber e nada fazer senão jogar aos dados, caçar, ouvir bobos  e entregarem-se a voluptuosidades sórdidas.

Com que amigos, com efeito, um príncipe cordato e piedoso poderá  relacionar-se voluntariamente senão com os que estão sempre prontos, sabem de muito e nada dizem por complacência?

Ora não se pode, sentencio eu, extrair mais proveito de um livro que não seja das obras que transmitiram fielmente à posterioridade os feitos realizados nos domínios públicos e privados, sobretudo se é para alguém de sangue real ou nobre e que está imbuído dos preceitos da filosofia  a que acedeu. Na realidade, os que se ocuparam em estudar a boa fórmula de conduta a adoptar mais do que narrarem minuciosamente a conduta que tiveram (Heródoto faz parte deles) são úteis na medida em que propõem ao olhar dos outros um simulacro (ou estátua) dum bom príncipe, pelo menos desde que o tenham esculpido  com arte e verdade. 

Por outro lado, além de outros benefícios, e são numerosos, que se retiram dos escritores de boa fé, há um de primeira importância: nada acende  tanto os bons ânimos dos reis e os impulsiona  a realizarem acções louváveis, nada retém mais e refreia a cupidez dos tiranos, do que aperceberem-se, uns e outros, que pelos escritos dos historiadores, toda a sua vida vai ser brevemente representada sobre o teatro do mundo inteiro, e o que é mais ainda, por todos os séculos; que tudo o que realizam, por hora em segredo, tudo o que cobrem de um pretexto ou constrangem, pela intimidação,  a dissimular mais que a ignorar, vai ser daqui a pouco tempo ser transmitido  ao olhos de todos em plena luz e que a posterioridade vai, liberta do medo e da esperança, e incorrupta por qualquer partidarismo [infelizmente tão dominante hoje], num magno consenso, aplaudir as acções rectas, e também livremente apupar  e assobiar as que não o são». Resumindo, diminuam ou acabem as acções injustas, desonestas, hipócritas que são hoje muitas  no mundo ocidental político oligarquizado, anti-democrático ou mesmo ditatorial, ao perseguir cada vez mais o assobiar e criticar, mesmo nas simples redes sociais, e violentamente anti-multipolar, em tudo isso indiferente à fortuna dos seus cidadãos e do mundo, governando só para uma elite. O que Erasmo condenaria veementemente.

Saudemos luminosamente Erasmo e que ele possa inspirar-nos a reagir e a lutar contra o estado calamitoso do Ocidente em guerra com a Rússia e com o Irão, dois países que lutam pela justiça, a liberdade, a multipolaridade, a república das Letras e da Sabedoria fraterna, de modo a aprofundarmos mais o conhecimento, a gnose, a filosofia e teologia perene, e a religação crística e divina.

                           

Os que morrem e os que ressuscitam, os odiados e os adorados. Notícias mundiais e reflexões gnósicas. O warmonger Lindsey Graham e o novo líder do Irão.

Os que seguem os acontecimentos mundiais no campo unificado da informação mundial, sobretudo pela internet, receberam hoje duas notícias opostas mas complementares na harmonia da providência planetária.

O senador republicano norte americano, Lindsey Graham, notável pelo seu ódio à Rússia, Irão, Palestina, Cuba e Venezuela livres, tal como já tinha sido  do Iraque nuclear, grande amigo e conselheiro de Trump e partidário da hegemonia absoluta do imperialismo norte-americano e do sionismo do regime de Telavive, milionário à custa das guerras e dos armamentos,morreu em Washington com 71 anos, uma idade que não parecia ter, já que as viagens constantes, e a animosidade ou ódio que o moviam, bem patente nos pedidos de bombardearem nuclearmente o Iraque,  o Irão e Gaza, tinham-no envelhecido e assinalado na face (tal o lábio inferior esquerdo bastante descaído), os sinais dos desequilíbrios psico-somáticos graves e tão nefastos para a humanidade.

Um comunicado do seu gabinete de senador influente, altamente patrocinado pelos lobbies das armas e sionistas, justifica a morte por doença súbita e inesperada, e que um relatório médico declarou ser um ataque cardíaco. Chamados os paramédicos a casa (pelo seu secretário?) já nada puderam fazer. Anote-se que Lindsey nunca se casara nem tivera filhos, mas tinha uma irmã com descendente,

Donald Trump já informou os seus seguidores da morte do seu grande amigo e um dos melhores senadores que conheceu, o que é muito triste, e que brevemente serão dados informações quanto ao funeral.

Lindsey Graham chegara na véspera de uma visita a Kiev ao seu  amigo Zelensky e não sabemos se ouviu alguns dos bombardeamentos dos russos sobre cidade e se isso o terá afectado. Contudo, a última fotografia pública mostra-o a rir  durante uma visita à fábrica SkyFall de drones em Kiev, segurando mesmo um com as mãos, feliz. Além de ter feito uma breve comunicação à imprensa, confiante no novo pacote de sanções contra a Rússia que conseguira de Trump, e que iria ser votado no Congresso em favor do regime de Kiev, "para o tornar mais letal". Anote-se que embora duas fábricas de drones fossem destruídas nesse dia, o Ministério da Defesa russo não referiu a que ele visitou.

Como foi a viagem de regresso, como estava a coerência do seu espírito, com a sua personalidade extremista e o coração e corpo já desgastado, que causas mais específicas psico-somáticas levaram o coração a colapsar não sabemos bem, o que é certo é que um dos maiores inimigos da Pax Universalis extinguiu-se. 

Só podemos desejar que seja tratado nos mundos do além com a justiça que merece ao ter contribuído para tantos mortos e traumatizados pelas agressões, assassínios e guerras americanas e israelitas.

A corajosa jornalista Ana Kasparina, forte defensora da causa palestiniana mas não tanto da governação iraniana pode retirar o pedido que constantemente fizera, de que ele fosse viver (ou despejado de paraquedas) para Telavive pois era lá que estavam os seus.

Não, Lindsey Graham foi retirado algo prematuramente em termos da duração de vida dos políticos ocidentais muito bem tratados medicamente, provavelmente porque chegara ao limite, esgotara o seu tempo de vida devido a ser um agente frenético uma voz fanática, da destruição e extermínio dos adversários (Irão está a ser e o próximo seria Cuba, afirmava) e que ainda por cima tinha hábitos considerados moralmente controversos, que escondia.

Pesem os elogios dos mais extremistas norte-americanos, ucranianos e israelitas, cremos que para o planeta foi muito bom ter sido chamado a prestar contas, tal como no mesmo dia o ex-emir do Qatar. 

Acrescente-se, já no dia 13,  que  a grande comunidade dos comentadores mais lúcidos e libertos do domínio da oligarquia, do imperialismo e do sionismo, pois ainda há os que dizem que foi a Rússia ou o Irão a envenenarem-no, tem sido unânime em condená-lo nas suas várias facetas mais tenebrosas, especulando alguns se terá morrido ainda em Kiev, tais George Galloway, Stanislav Krapivnik, Emil Cosman, Rachel Belvin, Sebastian Sas,  Alex Christoforous, Syed Mahmud, Levan Gudaze, Dimitris Lascaris, Ben Meiselas e Scott Ritter, este traçando um quadro psicológico muito preciso da ganância e malvadez do invejoso e orgulhoso senador, pedindo a misericórdia divina sobre ele...

Já fora das asas de morte e antes quase que sendo uma ressurreição, é o comunicado do Ayatollah líder do Irão actual Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei de que irá realizar uma conferência pública na próxima Terça-feira pelo entardecer, pondo fim às especulações de que estaria morto ou demasiado desfigurado pelo bombardeamento dos assassinos democratas israelo-americanos, que matou igualmente a sua mulher e filha e genro, além do pai Ali Khamenei. 

Sem ter as qualidades ímpares do pai, tão demonizado injustamente pelo Ocidente (com o sujo do Trump a chamar-lhe de gay), conseguirá co-liderar sábia e harmoniosamente a grande civiização iraniana?

 Como já está desde há muito ameaçado de morte, e como mais traiçoeiros do que os norte-americanos e israelitas não há, até o pior se pode esperar, devermos orar para que os iranianos tomem as necessárias medidas de precaução e seja protegido pelos mundos espirituais.

Segue-se a notícia, na press.tv.ir, um dos poucos canais informativos iranianos que o Ocidente antidemocrático da UE, NATO e USA-Israel ainda permite vermos, embora com intermitências:

                            

Líder da Revolução Islâmica O Aiatolá Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei irá sediar uma cerimônia de comemoração para seu pai, o Aiatolá Seyyed Ali Khamenei, que foi martirizado em ataques aéreos dos EUA e de Israel ao Irã.

«Num anúncio no domingo, o gabinete do Líder disse que o memorial será realizado em nome do Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei no Mosalla Imam Khomeini de Teerão, das 17h às 19h, horário local, na terça-feira.

"Sem dúvida, a presença de enlutados na cerimónia reafirmará o pacto inquebrável de continuar no caminho do mártir Khamenei e renovará o compromisso de lealdade ao justo sucessor do mártir Imam," acrescentou.

O Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei foi assassinado, com alguns dos seus familiares, no dia 28 de fevereiro, o primeiro dia da guerra de agressão ilegal de 40 dias desfechada pelos Estados Unidos e pelo regime israelita contra o Irão.

Em 8 de março, a Assembleia de Especialistas do Irão nomeou oficialmente o Aiatolá Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei como o novo Líder da Revolução Islâmica.

As cerimônias de funeral em massa e despedida do falecido Líder ocorreram no Irão e no Iraque de 3 a 10 de julho.

O sepultamento final ocorreu no santuário sagrado do Imam Reza (AS), o oitavo Imam shiia ou xiita, na cidade iraniana de Mashhad na alba de sexta-feira.

De acordo com estimativas, entre 41 e 43 milhões de pessoas participaram do cortejo fúnebre no Irã e no Iraque, tornando-o funeral maior na história da Humanidade.»

Alexander Dugin: "From Special Operation to Civilizational War. No more pretending". July 11. With a brief introduction.

                                                

In this very important text Alexander Dugin explains what is happening and what changed with the declarations of Putin and Peskov that Russia is now on war with NATO and USA in Ukraine and Donbas, and how Russian people should realize these hard reality entered by all: no more a special militar operation of recovery of what was from Russia, but a existencial war against the NATO and Kiev Regime, who want to destroy the Russian Federation. 

In the intelection or vision of Alexander Dugin, and he has been voicing them since long ago, he claims: first, the West is abusing in its escalation, in crossing the russian red lines and the answer from the Federation and the Kremlin has been meek or weak; second, in line with Iranian or Persian state civilzation worship of Truth, he echoes the recent words of the Ministry of Defense: in such a urgent time  "mistakes are possible — lying is not"; third, a change in the mentality of persons, by the recognition that we are in a tense time of war, and that all russians, and specially the leaders, managers and responsables, should be strong in the determination to win.

Alexander Dugin analyses  so with much concentration what the western powers and specially the British, the ones more anti-Russian, we may say, are doing in the escalation of the war and and he speculates how Russian Federation should answer to them in a more detterent and hard way, and dives deep into the rotation of the elites, the meritocracy needed, and war people taking on now the answers.

It is a good and dramatic text, even with one or two part  questionables, as for example not to speak of the intervention  of Boris Johnson in 2022 to destroy the agreements to be signed in Ankara (offering to the regime of Kiev all the suport from the oligarchic government of the world), anti-diplomatic intervention which collapsed the begining and hopeful quick end of the special millitary action. Or to think that the initiative to bomb the Sebastopol Defense Museum was only taken by the British warmongers and not the Ukrainian. Or to declare that Iran can only inflict unnacepatble damage to USA, and not say defeat their agression and grasp a full co-control of Hormuz strait...

Very important is his call to the work that is being done in the books and programs of education in schools and universities, instiling or giving a patriotic sense and awakening the students for the war times we are living, and in that sense he feels happy to see the divulgation in one of the  texts books of the life and works of bright martyr Daria Dugina Platonova, indeed an example, a muse, for young generations. 

Alexander Dugin gives also some hints on what he is doing in his courses on Westernology, treating of the ideologcal, humanistic and spiritual differences beteween the Western Civilization and Russia civilization, this one, now, in a war (waged not only military, but also by western influencers and a domestic 6º column), to be fully assumed, developed and sustained creatively and with heroism.

I underlined the most important statements of the father of Dasha.

From Special Operation to Civilizational War No more pretending Alexander Dugin Jul 11 ∙ Guest post Alexander Dugin argues that Russia’s official recognition of a war with the collective West marks a decisive turning point that will reshape the country’s politics, society, and understanding of the conflict. Conversation with Alexander Dugin on the Sputnik TV program Escalation. Host: We’re going live on Sputnik radio. In the studio with us is Mikhail Alimov. Good afternoon, everyone. This is philosopher Alexander Dugin’s authorial program “Escalation.” Recently, Dmitry Peskov, the press secretary of the President of Russia, made a highly symbolic and important statement: he said that the Special Military Operation [SMO] has turned into a real war because “behind Kiev stands a number of European capitals and, unfortunately, Washington.” That’s a direct quote. Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], please tell us: at what point did this transformation occur? After all, European capitals joined the process almost immediately. Alexander Dugin: I think this transformation — the one we’re talking about and the one the President’s press secretary mentioned — has occurred primarily in our own minds. Previously, we understood the Special Military Operation as a technical action designed to cool down the West’s aggressive plans. It was supposed to be conducted in a local mode, within a limited regional format, with full control over escalation risks. The SMO needed to be carried out swiftly and successfully and concluded fairly quickly. After that, we were supposed to begin normalizing relations with the West, which could have taken a certain amount of time. At the beginning of the SMO, the goal was to secure our political sovereignty within the framework of the existing single global — that is, Western — world, whose legitimacy we largely recognized. We were only supposed to expand the scale of our independence and increase our importance within the overall world order, without directly challenging the West, without entering into war with it, and without provoking it into open conflict. The task was limited: to change the local configuration of our presence in the post-Soviet space by establishing control over what we firmly considered our zone of responsibility. It was believed that this could be achieved through technical means, without a complete break with the West. That, in my view, was the original calculation. There’s no point in discussing today whether it was correct — it turned out to be wrong. It’s possible the plan itself was properly constructed, but its implementation went differently. What happened, happened. The main thing is that in May 2022 we failed to take Kiev. We were in Hostomel, right next to the city, but for a whole range of reasons we couldn’t capture it — and with that, the original plan was exhausted. From that moment, a new situation and a new reality emerged. The Special Military Operation ceased to be a special military operation — that is, something technical, local, regional, fast, and successful. The logic of any such operation is simple: you quickly do something difficult and unpleasant, and then for a long time, through diplomatic efforts, you smooth over its negative consequences. But everything went differently. The Special Military Operation ended with our withdrawal from Kiev, and in the spring of 2022, a war essentially began. The West, which apparently believed we would rather quickly prevail in this operation, couldn’t believe its own eyes. It couldn’t believe that Ukraine had held out — and then it threw itself fully into the conflict. From that moment onward, we have been at war. However, when the Special Military Operation as a blitzkrieg failed and the war began, it required very complex reflection on what was happening, and that took a lot of time. Remember: at first, criminal cases were even opened against people who spoke about a “war,” because officially a Special Military Operation was underway and that was the only way it could be referred to. Anyone who uttered the word “war” faced direct legal prosecution — administrative, and sometimes criminal. But at some point, punishment for using the word “war” in relation to the Special Military Operation in Ukraine was lifted, and from then on the situation began to change. Nevertheless, it took another four years for us to finally and officially acknowledge the reality. After all, the President’s press secretary doesn’t express a personal opinion — he conveys the opinion of the President, and that opinion is directive in nature. In other words, the SMO should now be called a war, and accordingly, what is happening in Ukraine should be understood as a war. So, for four years our consciousness was coming into alignment with reality. Now we have essentially acknowledged that we are talking about a war. Everything is clear: this is war. And we must immediately add — as Peskov also did — the clarification: war with whom exactly? This is not a war with Ukraine — this is a war with the West. And this war, as Peskov rightly noted with the words “unfortunately,” is also being waged against America, against the United States, which is fighting on the opposite side, on the side of our enemies — despite all the statements and steps Trump took at the beginning of his second presidential term. That is where we stand today. And the question arises: why was this statement made today with such clarity, unambiguity, and irreversibility — that we are in a state of war with the collective West? Host: To answer a pressing question from society? Alexander Dugin: I think there are two reasons — an internal one and an external one. The first, internal reason is the intensification of the conflict, which now affects almost the entire population: drone strikes on our rear areas, terrorist attacks carried out by the Kiev criminal Nazi terrorist regime, problems with energy infrastructure, shelling of our territories, the increasing death of civilians, and the growing number of people drawn into the war. Of course, we suffer fewer losses at the front than the enemy — and that is right. We are advancing — and that is also right. We are on the offensive and we are winning. But we do suffer losses: that’s how war is. People are increasingly asking themselves: is this really a Special Military Operation? The very concept of a Special Military Operation implies that only a very narrow segment of forces is involved — professional military personnel, those who belong to that sector. Special military operations are conducted precisely by them: the army, special services, internal troops. But here the people themselves have been drawn into the events. The people being pulled into a Special Military Operation is a contradiction in terms — by definition, that cannot be. Therefore, Peskov — and in essence the President — had to explain to the people what is happening: we are in a state of war. And that is an entirely different matter. For four years the phrase “Special Military Operation” was used — and now it has been said outright: this is, after all, a war. Everyone already understands that a war is going on, but until the word is spoken from the top, it is not officially considered a war. Many of our agencies, ministries, governors, sectors, and many people had already realized that this is a war and that they needed to behave accordingly. Some, however, continued to live according to the logic of a Special Military Operation. Now what has been said applies to everyone: war is war. That is the internal answer to the question of why this statement was made precisely now: it seems it was no longer possible to remain silent. Silence would only have been possible if we had achieved a swift victory and captured Kiev — not just liberated Donbass, but actually taken Kiev. Then we could have said: it was a Special Military Operation; it turned out to be far heavier, more terrible, and more difficult than we had anticipated, but congratulations to everyone, medals all around — Ukraine is ours, the Special Military Operation is complete. But since such an outcome is not yet in sight, despite our offensive, people need to be told how things really stand. And in reality, we are in a state of the most severe war — moreover, in its very first stage. A war with the collective West. That is the first explanation. Now the second. Our military and political leadership, the agencies and services — everyone who truly understands what is happening — knows that the West is not preparing for a truce or de-escalation. The West — the European Union, all NATO countries, Rutte, the alliance itself — is preparing for a new wave of war against us: an attack on Kaliningrad, the use of missiles and other truly serious means against our territory. Even now, NATO drones are flying at us through the territory of the Baltic states. In fact, no one in the West is going to conclude a truce; no one intends to reduce the intensity of escalation. We thought Trump would be the figure who would defuse the situation or at least postpone the showdown. He may have postponed it somewhat, but we were unable to take advantage of that pause. And that postponement was not serious — it was declarative, expressed only in limited actions. In essence, the main thing in this war is intelligence support from the United States. This is generally a war of space surveillance, an information war. Without Starlink support, without the transfer of reconnaissance data, we would have already taken Kiev — it wouldn’t have been a problem. But with such surveillance, with the involvement of precisely the American reconnaissance system and American secure communications, with the most careful monitoring of our territory, the main problems arise. That is why Trump, mentioned by Peskov at the end with the words “unfortunately,” who is also participating in all of this, represents the most terrible and most crucial factor. Even the European Union, with all its considerable military power, without the American base of reconnaissance data and high technologies, would not have been able to wage a full-fledged war against us: we would have taken what was ours and then moved toward de-escalation. But the presence in this construction of “unfortunately, Trump,” as Peskov put it, changes everything. The entire infrastructure for transmitting reconnaissance data remains in place, while NATO and the European Union intend only to increase pressure on us. The criminal Kiev regime is prepared for anything, up to and including the use of dirty bombs. I think it’s no coincidence that they are striking the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. They are clearly preparing for something, and they have the ability to deliver a serious blow — including provoking a nuclear catastrophe in our country with a dirty bomb. We are, of course, fighting back, but with the unambiguous and total support of the Kiev regime by the entire West, such a scenario is entirely possible. So today we are at war. People need to be told where we stand so that they understand and are aware of what is happening responsibly, rationally, and objectively. And society must undoubtedly be restructured onto a war footing — essentially in preparation for a major world war, which has, in essence, already begun. We might like to end the conflict, agree to a truce, and even make certain concessions — the President has said that in Anchorage we agreed to a number of concessions. But most likely, no one will offer them to us anymore. The West has smelled blood; it has realized that it has truly clashed with us, and any truce options it offers us will proceed from exactly that. We have demonstrated, unfortunately, a number of weak sides — although we have also courageously held out — as well as many strong ones. Let us be objective: some things did not work out for us. The fact that the SMO failed  [[specially by intervention of Boris Johnson, the right hand of the World Economic Forum]],   as a blitzkrieg is in reality the main thing. Seeing this, they decided that we could be finished off, and they have essentially moved in that direction. We cannot convince them otherwise with words or even with individual small tactical successes. We now face a real examination — in the face of a major and inevitable war that we do not want, but which we cannot stop, prevent, or avoid. Any concessions we might make now would be incompatible with Russia’s continued existence. That is why, it seems to me, this situation is not new: it did not arise today but formed gradually. If we measure the path we have already traveled — the path of war — it is already more than four years. And how much more lies ahead? Moreover, we will have to go forward not under conditions of reduced tension and an improved situation, but under conditions of further escalation, which moreover does not depend on us. They escalate; we can try to de-escalate, but they do not listen. Our red lines are erased and not restored: they are erased — and they no longer exist. Seeing that we only react, only take limited retaliatory steps, they understand that they can engage in escalation under their own control, unilaterally, and to whatever extent they see fit. Right now we need to restructure the entire society. I think that in order to win this war, we also need to restructure the political system — temporarily, of course, onto a war footing. From this follow several fundamental conclusions. From the words of the President’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov it follows that we must restructure society, the economy, and the administrative system onto a war footing. Moreover, onto a war footing in which real, not paper, achievements will be rewarded, while failures in certain directions and missions — in the military sphere, the economy, and the administrative system — will be met with corresponding punishment. It is no coincidence that with the announcement of war, many rules are being tightened. What is permissible in peacetime — even if it may be harmful there too — becomes impermissible in wartime: when people are rewarded for failures; when window-dressing is encouraged rather than punished; when superiors are told what they want to hear rather than what is actually the case. Our Minister of Defense, Andrei Removich Belousov, by the way, speaks about this: mistakes are possible — lying is not. There is a sense that this peacetime flaw — the habit of embellishing things to please the boss — is being carried over into the military sphere as well. That is unacceptable. And of course, a rotation of elites is necessary. We need the best, truly effective people. In the new extreme conditions, the political system, the government, and the military department require, first of all, people who deserve the positions they hold — what is called meritocracy. Secondly, we need maximally effective people — emergency managers, crisis managers. Not just administrators, but precisely crisis administrators — those who perform well and effectively in extreme, emergency circumstances, not in ordinary ones. These are different types of people. Thus, we need a rotation of elites and the strengthening of the positions of crisis managers — more vigilant, sharper, bolder, more decisive, and even somewhat unbound people who follow instructions when possible, and when it is not — act at their own risk for the sake of victory. This is a different type of person. And now that the President’s press secretary has announced that we are at war, the peacetime elites must be replaced: peacetime managers must be replaced by crisis managers — that is, wartime administrators — with the creation of appropriate structures of reward and punishment suited to emergency circumstances. Thus, we need to take two steps. The first is truth — complete, responsible, honest, and, if necessary, bitter. It is absolutely essential. Otherwise, the fog of war will persist — but this fog is not being directed at our enemies. Our enemies understand everything perfectly; they see what is really happening with us. This fog of war is directed inward, at our own society. Inside the country, there must be complete transparency. We should be deceiving the enemy, not ourselves. However, it often seems we are doing the exact opposite — not always, of course, but far too often. The second step is the rotation of elites and the arrival of wartime people. And not only in sensitive military areas, but also in the economy, management, government, and the administrative system — and, if you will, in the humanitarian, cultural, and information spheres as well. Right now, all of these areas are still being run by peacetime managers. Paradoxically, even the army — which we do not criticize, but on the contrary, glorify — is only slowly and with great difficulty emerging from its peacetime state. Yes, our army will win; our army is the best; it has excellent leadership; we have the strongest army in the world. But it feels as though we are waking up to our own military reality as if coming out of a deep sleep. As if we had been peacefully dozing, convinced that we were the strongest, and had grown complacent. And now we are being told: prove that you are the strongest, demonstrate it, achieve results. And we reply, as if still half-asleep: come on, we’ll deal with all of you anyway. However, today it is not enough to simply maintain confidence in what we truly are. I have no doubt that we are the best, the strongest, the bravest, and the most victorious — just as our ancestors were, and as we actually are. But we have forgotten who we are. The army must remember what victory is, how it is achieved, and what actions are required to attain it. We need a society of victory and reforms of victory. Host: You spoke earlier about certain changes specifically in the administrative sector. How can this be done? We have State Duma elections in September, for example. Through this mechanism, or do we need something radically new? Alexander Dugin: Of course not. The elections, thank God, will go as they should: everyone will be elected correctly. But what do elections have to do with it? They serve a function similar to a sociological poll. All reforms in our country can be carried out only and exclusively from the top. The people are thirsting for these reforms and are asking for them — asking to bring society, governance, the social model, and the political system into line with popular expectations. Our society is addressing this request to the head of state, to the President. This is not an ultimatum or a demand — it is a humble, respectful request. People are simply saying: we bow before you — please carry out the reform. And this request is directed to the President. No one intends to resolve this issue through voting. Host: The press office of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has released new information regarding the strike on the Museum of the Defense of Sevastopol. It turns out this was a carefully planned provocation by London and British special services, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces were probably not even aware of the true target of the attack. In your view, why would London target objectives that have so little military significance? Alexander Dugin: Before addressing this very important question, I would like to ask another: why is the SVR releasing this information right now? The fact is that our intelligence officers and analysts — sober and attentive people — have understood perfectly since the very beginning, since the spring of 2022, that we are not fighting Ukraine. Through Ukraine, we are fighting the West. On the other side stand the British, representatives of the European Union, and the Americans. It is they who are directing this war: they guide Ukrainian drones, calculate and plot routes, and oversee operations via satellite. Yes, Starlink does not work over our territory, but there are other reconnaissance satellites that we cannot yet neutralize — at least until we destroy the entire space-based system. Such methods also exist, and we are probably thinking about them now. In any case, the drones that kill our people, destroy energy infrastructure, and strike even more sensitive targets (which we are not talking about yet, but probably will) are operated by British specialists using British and American intelligence data. Ukraine is merely a mask. In essence, Ukraine does not really exist as an independent actor — it is a conditional entity, a simulacrum, a kind of golem or robot through which the West is fighting us. I believe the Foreign Intelligence Service has released this information about the strike on the Sevastopol Defense Museum now precisely because Peskov has already said: we are at war with the West. This timing is not coincidental — that is the first answer. The second point: for some people this is a revelation, whereas for most attentive analysts and participants in the war we are waging against the West, it is self-evident. So some will be surprised, while others will say: well, obviously. Moreover, the British have struck not only this museum. I think our special services are well aware of this, and so is the President. But now we, the public, also know about it — that is the difference. It means we are being brought into this war by raising our understanding of what is happening to a more adequate level. Indeed, what kind of Special Military Operation is this if our sacred symbolic sites are being attacked by the British? This cannot be a Special Military Operation. We are not conducting a special military operation to land troops on English territory. No — this is not a special operation. For them it is a special operation; for us it is war. They are fighting us by proxy, with someone else’s hands. And now we will probably begin to fight them directly — and then we will see who prevails. But we must accept this reality. Why do they carry out such strikes? Because they are attacking symbolic targets and because the West is conducting escalation that it itself controls. The process of escalation is also a form of military art. And the West — primarily the British — believes that this escalation dial, which can be turned up a little or a lot, switched from 1.0 to 1.2 or 2.3 — all these fine gradations (2.3, 2.4, 1.8) — must be completely under their control. We are assigned the role of the responding side. Look: they strike the energy system, civilian objects, symbolic targets like this museum. We respond. How exactly do we respond? Do we inform society or not? They measure that. Do we strike back at certain targets or others? They measure that too. Knowing that the missile was effectively launched by the British, do we at least verbally respond to the British? They measure that as well. In this way, they manage escalation alone. If they need to dial it down a bit, they do so when it suits them. If they want to increase it, they do. Until the recent fundamental statement by Peskov that we are at war with the West — and with America too — we were not part of this full escalation process. We responded, tried not to notice this escalation, and tried to extinguish it unilaterally by simply refusing to join it. It was as if someone was waging war on you, and you pretended everything was fine. That is roughly how things stood. Inside the country, the message was: no, the West is merely supporting Ukraine. Ukraine is bad, but we are not at war with the West itself. At the same time, we sent signals to them: although you are raising the level of escalation, we are not being drawn into it and will not fall for provocations. You raise the temperature — we do not. But then they raise it even higher: the next strike hits another target — symbolic, military, strategic, or energy-related. What would our inclusion in the escalation process mean? For example, a sudden strike on the Baltic states, Poland, or Romania; sabotage of key strategic military facilities in Germany or France that are being used against us; the elimination of certain prominent figures in British intelligence most involved in this war. Or sending some kind of signal to the Americans — roughly in the Iranian style: if we cannot reach them directly, we must make them feel real pain. And not secretly, but openly: sending divers to cut underwater cables in the Baltic Sea leading to the Baltics, followed by an incursion onto their territory. Are they afraid to direct missiles at the Museum of the Defense of Sevastopol? No, they are not. Why? Because they feel they are playing alone. Only they are playing this game of escalation. We are only taking limited, predictably weaker retaliatory steps to convince everyone — ourselves and them — that we are not seriously playing. We are not turning on full escalation. Meanwhile, everyone understands — and most importantly, the President understands — that the British stood behind the strike on the Sevastopol panorama museum. They directed the missile, American reconnaissance satellites plotted the route, and they pushed the button. Ukraine had nothing to do with it.  Our President sees this. And when he sees it and does not respond, they draw the conclusion: fine, everything is clear — the Russians will continue playing at de-escalation, while we will continue playing at escalation, because it costs us nothing. We erase their red lines; they draw new ones — we erase those too. And nothing happens to us. This is already beginning to resemble Gorbachev’s time. We said: we will no longer fight the West or the Western system; we are reaching out to you with an open hand. And into that outstretched hand they placed a grenade with the pin pulled: they destroyed our power in Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact, then broke up the Soviet Union and began dismembering the Russian Federation — from which only Putin saved us. We were on the verge of the next cascade of consequences after unilaterally ending the Cold War. And to “end” the Cold War in their language means only one thing: to lose it. The same thing is repeating now at the level of escalation. They say: we are escalating with you. And we reply: we are not escalating with you. It seems to me that the limits of this position have been exhausted. We have demonstrated our peacefulness, goodwill, readiness for mutual understanding, for certain concessions, and for normalizing relations more than enough. Our President went to Anchorage; we talked with the Americans and explained everything; we are ready to engage with the European Union. But they are not ready and will not be ready — that is the problem. They will not be ready until something truly convincing happens. For example — I am only speculating — one day we wake up and the military and political leadership of Kiev is gone. Some other people appear, running around in panic. And the second tier of leadership is gone too. At that point they will truly say: perhaps we should negotiate, otherwise the Russians will keep going. Then they will be ready to talk. And if we feel confident, we may choose not to negotiate and continue — or we may agree. Other scenarios are also possible. I am not a military specialist. Everyone loves to give advice these days: people from the sidelines tell the army and the President what to do. I do not count myself among them — I am simply speculating. I am only applying the lessons of the past, or for example the experience of Iran in its confrontation, to our situation. Iran cannot defeat the United States and Israel, but it can inflict unacceptable damage on them — economic damage, for instance. That is what Iran does.  And we too can inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy in many different ways. We say: escalation is inevitable — and we are joining it. You raise the dial — and we, for example, raise it even higher. But it is not enough to just say this. It is obvious that they no longer react to our statements: all our protests and all our new red lines are perceived by them as white noise. It is also obvious that they treat words not followed by actions so serious they cannot be ignored with extreme frivolity. We now face a very serious question. Some, like Karaganov, say we need to deliver a preventive strategic nuclear strike — for example, against the United States or the European Union. Others suggest using tactical nuclear weapons. As I understand it, this might once have been feasible, but today it is no longer the most relevant option. What is needed now is a set of complex, multidimensional, carefully planned actions carried out simultaneously across many domains. Perhaps something in space — for example, the destruction of the entire satellite reconnaissance system, since it constitutes one of our main problems. Perhaps other actions that no one expects from us. And all at once: one, two, three. If and when we manage to create six or seven such unpredictable, untrackable centers of real confrontation, that could stop them. If we simply keep repeating “Enough, enough, enough — stop shelling our museums, leave our children alone, stop killing our schoolchildren, stop blowing up our trains, leave our oil refineries and even more important facilities alone,” no one will listen. Host: Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], perhaps alongside these escalatory mechanisms, some preparation is already underway to ready our society and our future adult citizens for this changing world. I’m thinking, for example, of the recent changes to the history textbooks. There are so many topics to discuss, but I’d like to touch on this one too. Regarding the new edition of the unified history textbook series — in your view, is the goal of these changes what I just mentioned, or is a more comprehensive task being set? Alexander Dugin: You see, we have grown too accustomed to peacetime rhetoric: “I agree with you, but not entirely,” “let’s discuss the details,” “let’s not discuss the details.” The new textbooks — especially the history ones — are necessary to raise genuine, fully formed Russian patriots and to place patriotism at the center of our historical self-awareness. Yes, we need new citizens who will be proud of their Motherland, who will sincerely love Russia, know its history, understand its identity, know its heroes — and know its enemies. This is the primary task that the new series of textbooks is designed to accomplish: to instill in our children civic consciousness, a sense of dignity, patriotism, love for the Motherland, and an understanding of historical patterns. I am, of course, deeply moved and immensely grateful to the authors for including in one of these textbooks the tragic fate of my daughter, Darya Dugina. People should know those who suffered for the Fatherland, those who gave their lives for the Motherland. It is on such images and examples — including Vladlen Tatarsky and the new heroes of the Special Military Operation and our war with the West — that we must raise the next generation. Naturally, all generations matter — our grandfathers and great-grandfathers who built and defended our country. But the heroes who live among us are also important — people just like us: young men and women who today exemplify heroism, self-sacrifice, courage, intelligence, service to the Fatherland, love for the Motherland, loyalty to the Christian Church, our civilization, and our identity. They too belong in this textbook — and they have been included. Here is what I want to say: some good deeds require no “buts,” no reservations like “it could have been done better.” It can always be done better — we will continue working on that. But the main thing is to do what is necessary: to restore dignity, pride, and love for the Fatherland in our schools, at the very foundation of our education. We are doing the same thing, by the way, at the level of higher education — in universities and institutes. At the Ivan Ilyin Higher Political School, we teach courses in “Western studies” (Westernology), treating the West as a different civilization. We offer courses affirming that Russia is a state-civilization, courses on multipolarity, and courses on identity. We have set ourselves an ambitious goal: to rebuild the entire humanities education and the entire field of humanitarian scholarship on this patriotic foundation. Unfortunately, the overall situation is still different. But the struggle for our children is the most important thing, and in schools this task has already been addressed. Work continues in other areas. A great deal has already been done through the course “Foundations of Russian Statehood,” which provides a certain inoculation of patriotism in universities. We must continue, develop, and expand this direction — broaden the field of Western studies, change the paradigms in the humanities based on the thesis repeatedly articulated by our President: Russia is a state-civilization. We live in a multipolar world where, alongside the West, there are other centers of power and other civilizations, including our own. This restructuring of the entire humanitarian approach, of education and upbringing as a whole, is now underway at full speed — but “full speed” only by peacetime standards, or by the standards of a Special Military Operation. By the standards of a war with the West, this pace is still insufficient. While the situation with school history is good, in higher education things are moving in the right direction — the correct instructions have been given — but far too slowly, because there is enormous resistance. Some resist out of inertia, others for ideological reasons. This is the sixth column — opponents of the idea that Russia is a distinct civilization. After all, Russophobia did not appear by accident, and not just in recent years. That said, we cannot reduce everything to spy networks, even though serious work has been done in that area. For the last 30–40 years, our enemies have simply been operating in the humanitarian sphere — centers that distorted the consciousness of our scholars, altered the educational process, promoted toxic trends in the humanities, and supported them. All of this exists. But the issue cannot be reduced to espionage alone. Even if we identify the entire network of Western agents of influence in the humanities, it will not be enough, because an entire generation of teachers and scholars has already been trained to view the West as universal. This is what we must fight against. Therefore, the war that we are discussing today — and that Peskov spoke about — naturally affects all spheres of our society, including school education and, I believe, even preschool education. “Lessons about the most important things” should be conducted even for the youngest children. Let them sit on their potties and listen to stories about great heroes — then they will come to school already with the first seeds of civic consciousness. We must shift our society into a different, awakened state — a state of affirming the distinctiveness, independence, and uniqueness of our civilization, which we are called upon to defend. It is precisely they — today’s youth, schoolchildren, and even kindergarten children — who will be called upon to protect and uphold our civilizational sovereignty, our dignity, our freedom, and our independence in the face of very serious challenges, including technological ones. And if we are making this turn — and we can no longer avoid making it, because all the deadlines for dodging a serious civilizational conflict with the West have passed — then we must act quickly. Changing course, shifting the direction of this great ship from mere political sovereignty to full civilizational sovereignty is, of course, extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the helm must be turned — with a loud creak, because we need to change the course of an entire continent, and its inertia is enormous. This inertia comes not only from the last 30–40 years, but from the Petrine era: the West has long attracted and pulled us toward itself. Now a rather sharp break is required. We have been capable of such turns before — in the 19th and 20th centuries. But now we need another patriotic turn. It will be incredibly difficult to carry out, yet it must be done quickly. Host: Literally within how many years? After all, when we talk about civilization, we usually think in terms of centuries. But if it has to be fast, how long is that? Alexander Dugin: I cannot give an exact number. One thing is clear: the longer we delay, the worse our starting conditions become. The earlier we had declared that we are in a state of war with the West, the better the results we would already have. But better late than never. I won’t venture to say exactly how many years. We don’t have much time. I think we are talking about years, not decades — even though civilizations operate on much longer cycles. In that sense you are right. However, right now a paradigm shift is taking place, including in education.»