Alexander Dugin argues that Russia’s official recognition of a war with the collective West marks a decisive turning point that will reshape the country’s politics, society, and understanding of the conflict.
Conversation with Alexander Dugin on the Sputnik TV program Escalation.
Host: We’re going live on Sputnik radio. In the studio with us is Mikhail Alimov. Good afternoon, everyone. This is philosopher Alexander Dugin’s authorial program “Escalation.” Recently, Dmitry Peskov, the press secretary of the President of Russia, made a highly symbolic and important statement: he said that the Special Military Operation [SMO] has turned into a real war because “behind Kiev stands a number of European capitals and, unfortunately, Washington.” That’s a direct quote. Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], please tell us: at what point did this transformation occur? After all, European capitals joined the process almost immediately.
Alexander Dugin: I think this transformation — the one we’re talking about and the one the President’s press secretary mentioned — has occurred primarily in our own minds. Previously, we understood the Special Military Operation as a technical action designed to cool down the West’s aggressive plans. It was supposed to be conducted in a local mode, within a limited regional format, with full control over escalation risks. The SMO needed to be carried out swiftly and successfully and concluded fairly quickly. After that, we were supposed to begin normalizing relations with the West, which could have taken a certain amount of time. At the beginning of the SMO, the goal was to secure our political sovereignty within the framework of the existing single global — that is, Western — world, whose legitimacy we largely recognized. We were only supposed to expand the scale of our independence and increase our importance within the overall world order, without directly challenging the West, without entering into war with it, and without provoking it into open conflict. The task was limited: to change the local configuration of our presence in the post-Soviet space by establishing control over what we firmly considered our zone of responsibility. It was believed that this could be achieved through technical means, without a complete break with the West.
That, in my view, was the original calculation. There’s no point in discussing today whether it was correct — it turned out to be wrong. It’s possible the plan itself was properly constructed, but its implementation went differently. What happened, happened. The main thing is that in May 2022 we failed to take Kiev. We were in Hostomel, right next to the city, but for a whole range of reasons we couldn’t capture it — and with that, the original plan was exhausted. From that moment, a new situation and a new reality emerged. The Special Military Operation ceased to be a special military operation — that is, something technical, local, regional, fast, and successful. The logic of any such operation is simple: you quickly do something difficult and unpleasant, and then for a long time, through diplomatic efforts, you smooth over its negative consequences. But everything went differently.
The Special Military Operation ended with our withdrawal from Kiev, and in the spring of 2022, a war essentially began. The West, which apparently believed we would rather quickly prevail in this operation, couldn’t believe its own eyes. It couldn’t believe that Ukraine had held out — and then it threw itself fully into the conflict. From that moment onward, we have been at war.
However, when the Special Military Operation as a blitzkrieg failed and the war began, it required very complex reflection on what was happening, and that took a lot of time. Remember: at first, criminal cases were even opened against people who spoke about a “war,” because officially a Special Military Operation was underway and that was the only way it could be referred to. Anyone who uttered the word “war” faced direct legal prosecution — administrative, and sometimes criminal. But at some point, punishment for using the word “war” in relation to the Special Military Operation in Ukraine was lifted, and from then on the situation began to change. Nevertheless, it took another four years for us to finally and officially acknowledge the reality. After all, the President’s press secretary doesn’t express a personal opinion — he conveys the opinion of the President, and that opinion is directive in nature. In other words, the SMO should now be called a war, and accordingly, what is happening in Ukraine should be understood as a war.
So, for four years our consciousness was coming into alignment with reality. Now we have essentially acknowledged that we are talking about a war. Everything is clear: this is war. And we must immediately add — as Peskov also did — the clarification: war with whom exactly? This is not a war with Ukraine — this is a war with the West. And this war, as Peskov rightly noted with the words “unfortunately,” is also being waged against America, against the United States, which is fighting on the opposite side, on the side of our enemies — despite all the statements and steps Trump took at the beginning of his second presidential term. That is where we stand today.
And the question arises: why was this statement made today with such clarity, unambiguity, and irreversibility — that we are in a state of war with the collective West?
Host: To answer a pressing question from society?
Alexander Dugin: I think there are two reasons — an internal one and an external one.
The first, internal reason is the intensification of the conflict, which now affects almost the entire population: drone strikes on our rear areas, terrorist attacks carried out by the Kiev criminal Nazi terrorist regime, problems with energy infrastructure, shelling of our territories, the increasing death of civilians, and the growing number of people drawn into the war. Of course, we suffer fewer losses at the front than the enemy — and that is right. We are advancing — and that is also right. We are on the offensive and we are winning. But we do suffer losses: that’s how war is.
People are increasingly asking themselves: is this really a Special Military Operation? The very concept of a Special Military Operation implies that only a very narrow segment of forces is involved — professional military personnel, those who belong to that sector. Special military operations are conducted precisely by them: the army, special services, internal troops. But here the people themselves have been drawn into the events. The people being pulled into a Special Military Operation is a contradiction in terms — by definition, that cannot be. Therefore, Peskov — and in essence the President — had to explain to the people what is happening: we are in a state of war. And that is an entirely different matter.
For four years the phrase “Special Military Operation” was used — and now it has been said outright: this is, after all, a war. Everyone already understands that a war is going on, but until the word is spoken from the top, it is not officially considered a war. Many of our agencies, ministries, governors, sectors, and many people had already realized that this is a war and that they needed to behave accordingly. Some, however, continued to live according to the logic of a Special Military Operation. Now what has been said applies to everyone: war is war.
That is the internal answer to the question of why this statement was made precisely now: it seems it was no longer possible to remain silent. Silence would only have been possible if we had achieved a swift victory and captured Kiev — not just liberated Donbass, but actually taken Kiev. Then we could have said: it was a Special Military Operation; it turned out to be far heavier, more terrible, and more difficult than we had anticipated, but congratulations to everyone, medals all around — Ukraine is ours, the Special Military Operation is complete. But since such an outcome is not yet in sight, despite our offensive, people need to be told how things really stand. And in reality, we are in a state of the most severe war — moreover, in its very first stage. A war with the collective West.
That is the first explanation. Now the second. Our military and political leadership, the agencies and services — everyone who truly understands what is happening — knows that the West is not preparing for a truce or de-escalation. The West — the European Union, all NATO countries, Rutte, the alliance itself — is preparing for a new wave of war against us: an attack on Kaliningrad, the use of missiles and other truly serious means against our territory. Even now, NATO drones are flying at us through the territory of the Baltic states. In fact, no one in the West is going to conclude a truce; no one intends to reduce the intensity of escalation.
We thought Trump would be the figure who would defuse the situation or at least postpone the showdown. He may have postponed it somewhat, but we were unable to take advantage of that pause. And that postponement was not serious — it was declarative, expressed only in limited actions. In essence, the main thing in this war is intelligence support from the United States. This is generally a war of space surveillance, an information war. Without Starlink support, without the transfer of reconnaissance data, we would have already taken Kiev — it wouldn’t have been a problem. But with such surveillance, with the involvement of precisely the American reconnaissance system and American secure communications, with the most careful monitoring of our territory, the main problems arise.
That is why Trump, mentioned by Peskov at the end with the words “unfortunately,” who is also participating in all of this, represents the most terrible and most crucial factor. Even the European Union, with all its considerable military power, without the American base of reconnaissance data and high technologies, would not have been able to wage a full-fledged war against us: we would have taken what was ours and then moved toward de-escalation. But the presence in this construction of “unfortunately, Trump,” as Peskov put it, changes everything. The entire infrastructure for transmitting reconnaissance data remains in place, while NATO and the European Union intend only to increase pressure on us.
The criminal Kiev regime is prepared for anything, up to and including the use of dirty bombs. I think it’s no coincidence that they are striking the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. They are clearly preparing for something, and they have the ability to deliver a serious blow — including provoking a nuclear catastrophe in our country with a dirty bomb. We are, of course, fighting back, but with the unambiguous and total support of the Kiev regime by the entire West, such a scenario is entirely possible.
So today we are at war. People need to be told where we stand so that they understand and are aware of what is happening responsibly, rationally, and objectively. And society must undoubtedly be restructured onto a war footing — essentially in preparation for a major world war, which has, in essence, already begun.
We might like to end the conflict, agree to a truce, and even make certain concessions — the President has said that in Anchorage we agreed to a number of concessions. But most likely, no one will offer them to us anymore. The West has smelled blood; it has realized that it has truly clashed with us, and any truce options it offers us will proceed from exactly that. We have demonstrated, unfortunately, a number of weak sides — although we have also courageously held out — as well as many strong ones. Let us be objective: some things did not work out for us. The fact that the SMO failed [[specially by intervention of Boris Johnson, the right hand of the World Economic Forum]], as a blitzkrieg is in reality the main thing. Seeing this, they decided that we could be finished off, and they have essentially moved in that direction. We cannot convince them otherwise with words or even with individual small tactical successes.
We now face a real examination — in the face of a major and inevitable war that we do not want, but which we cannot stop, prevent, or avoid. Any concessions we might make now would be incompatible with Russia’s continued existence.
That is why, it seems to me, this situation is not new: it did not arise today but formed gradually. If we measure the path we have already traveled — the path of war — it is already more than four years. And how much more lies ahead? Moreover, we will have to go forward not under conditions of reduced tension and an improved situation, but under conditions of further escalation, which moreover does not depend on us. They escalate; we can try to de-escalate, but they do not listen. Our red lines are erased and not restored: they are erased — and they no longer exist. Seeing that we only react, only take limited retaliatory steps, they understand that they can engage in escalation under their own control, unilaterally, and to whatever extent they see fit.
Right now we need to restructure the entire society. I think that in order to win this war, we also need to restructure the political system — temporarily, of course, onto a war footing.
From this follow several fundamental conclusions. From the words of the President’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov it follows that we must restructure society, the economy, and the administrative system onto a war footing. Moreover, onto a war footing in which real, not paper, achievements will be rewarded, while failures in certain directions and missions — in the military sphere, the economy, and the administrative system — will be met with corresponding punishment. It is no coincidence that with the announcement of war, many rules are being tightened. What is permissible in peacetime — even if it may be harmful there too — becomes impermissible in wartime: when people are rewarded for failures; when window-dressing is encouraged rather than punished; when superiors are told what they want to hear rather than what is actually the case. Our Minister of Defense, Andrei Removich Belousov, by the way, speaks about this: mistakes are possible — lying is not. There is a sense that this peacetime flaw — the habit of embellishing things to please the boss — is being carried over into the military sphere as well. That is unacceptable.
And of course, a rotation of elites is necessary. We need the best, truly effective people. In the new extreme conditions, the political system, the government, and the military department require, first of all, people who deserve the positions they hold — what is called meritocracy. Secondly, we need maximally effective people — emergency managers, crisis managers. Not just administrators, but precisely crisis administrators — those who perform well and effectively in extreme, emergency circumstances, not in ordinary ones. These are different types of people.
Thus, we need a rotation of elites and the strengthening of the positions of crisis managers — more vigilant, sharper, bolder, more decisive, and even somewhat unbound people who follow instructions when possible, and when it is not — act at their own risk for the sake of victory. This is a different type of person. And now that the President’s press secretary has announced that we are at war, the peacetime elites must be replaced: peacetime managers must be replaced by crisis managers — that is, wartime administrators — with the creation of appropriate structures of reward and punishment suited to emergency circumstances.
Thus, we need to take two steps.
The first is truth — complete, responsible, honest, and, if necessary, bitter. It is absolutely essential. Otherwise, the fog of war will persist — but this fog is not being directed at our enemies. Our enemies understand everything perfectly; they see what is really happening with us. This fog of war is directed inward, at our own society. Inside the country, there must be complete transparency. We should be deceiving the enemy, not ourselves. However, it often seems we are doing the exact opposite — not always, of course, but far too often.
The second step is the rotation of elites and the arrival of wartime people. And not only in sensitive military areas, but also in the economy, management, government, and the administrative system — and, if you will, in the humanitarian, cultural, and information spheres as well. Right now, all of these areas are still being run by peacetime managers.
Paradoxically, even the army — which we do not criticize, but on the contrary, glorify — is only slowly and with great difficulty emerging from its peacetime state. Yes, our army will win; our army is the best; it has excellent leadership; we have the strongest army in the world. But it feels as though we are waking up to our own military reality as if coming out of a deep sleep. As if we had been peacefully dozing, convinced that we were the strongest, and had grown complacent. And now we are being told: prove that you are the strongest, demonstrate it, achieve results. And we reply, as if still half-asleep: come on, we’ll deal with all of you anyway.
However, today it is not enough to simply maintain confidence in what we truly are. I have no doubt that we are the best, the strongest, the bravest, and the most victorious — just as our ancestors were, and as we actually are. But we have forgotten who we are. The army must remember what victory is, how it is achieved, and what actions are required to attain it. We need a society of victory and reforms of victory.
Host: You spoke earlier about certain changes specifically in the administrative sector. How can this be done? We have State Duma elections in September, for example. Through this mechanism, or do we need something radically new?
Alexander Dugin: Of course not. The elections, thank God, will go as they should: everyone will be elected correctly. But what do elections have to do with it? They serve a function similar to a sociological poll. All reforms in our country can be carried out only and exclusively from the top. The people are thirsting for these reforms and are asking for them — asking to bring society, governance, the social model, and the political system into line with popular expectations. Our society is addressing this request to the head of state, to the President. This is not an ultimatum or a demand — it is a humble, respectful request. People are simply saying: we bow before you — please carry out the reform. And this request is directed to the President. No one intends to resolve this issue through voting.
Host: The press office of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has released new information regarding the strike on the Museum of the Defense of Sevastopol. It turns out this was a carefully planned provocation by London and British special services, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces were probably not even aware of the true target of the attack. In your view, why would London target objectives that have so little military significance?
Alexander Dugin: Before addressing this very important question, I would like to ask another: why is the SVR releasing this information right now? The fact is that our intelligence officers and analysts — sober and attentive people — have understood perfectly since the very beginning, since the spring of 2022, that we are not fighting Ukraine. Through Ukraine, we are fighting the West. On the other side stand the British, representatives of the European Union, and the Americans. It is they who are directing this war: they guide Ukrainian drones, calculate and plot routes, and oversee operations via satellite. Yes, Starlink does not work over our territory, but there are other reconnaissance satellites that we cannot yet neutralize — at least until we destroy the entire space-based system. Such methods also exist, and we are probably thinking about them now.
In any case, the drones that kill our people, destroy energy infrastructure, and strike even more sensitive targets (which we are not talking about yet, but probably will) are operated by British specialists using British and American intelligence data. Ukraine is merely a mask. In essence, Ukraine does not really exist as an independent actor — it is a conditional entity, a simulacrum, a kind of golem or robot through which the West is fighting us.
I believe the Foreign Intelligence Service has released this information about the strike on the Sevastopol Defense Museum now precisely because Peskov has already said: we are at war with the West. This timing is not coincidental — that is the first answer.
The second point: for some people this is a revelation, whereas for most attentive analysts and participants in the war we are waging against the West, it is self-evident. So some will be surprised, while others will say: well, obviously. Moreover, the British have struck not only this museum. I think our special services are well aware of this, and so is the President. But now we, the public, also know about it — that is the difference. It means we are being brought into this war by raising our understanding of what is happening to a more adequate level. Indeed, what kind of Special Military Operation is this if our sacred symbolic sites are being attacked by the British? This cannot be a Special Military Operation. We are not conducting a special military operation to land troops on English territory. No — this is not a special operation. For them it is a special operation; for us it is war. They are fighting us by proxy, with someone else’s hands. And now we will probably begin to fight them directly — and then we will see who prevails. But we must accept this reality.
Why do they carry out such strikes? Because they are attacking symbolic targets and because the West is conducting escalation that it itself controls. The process of escalation is also a form of military art. And the West — primarily the British — believes that this escalation dial, which can be turned up a little or a lot, switched from 1.0 to 1.2 or 2.3 — all these fine gradations (2.3, 2.4, 1.8) — must be completely under their control.
We are assigned the role of the responding side. Look: they strike the energy system, civilian objects, symbolic targets like this museum. We respond. How exactly do we respond? Do we inform society or not? They measure that. Do we strike back at certain targets or others? They measure that too. Knowing that the missile was effectively launched by the British, do we at least verbally respond to the British? They measure that as well.
In this way, they manage escalation alone. If they need to dial it down a bit, they do so when it suits them. If they want to increase it, they do. Until the recent fundamental statement by Peskov that we are at war with the West — and with America too — we were not part of this full escalation process. We responded, tried not to notice this escalation, and tried to extinguish it unilaterally by simply refusing to join it. It was as if someone was waging war on you, and you pretended everything was fine. That is roughly how things stood.
Inside the country, the message was: no, the West is merely supporting Ukraine. Ukraine is bad, but we are not at war with the West itself. At the same time, we sent signals to them: although you are raising the level of escalation, we are not being drawn into it and will not fall for provocations. You raise the temperature — we do not. But then they raise it even higher: the next strike hits another target — symbolic, military, strategic, or energy-related.
What would our inclusion in the escalation process mean? For example, a sudden strike on the Baltic states, Poland, or Romania; sabotage of key strategic military facilities in Germany or France that are being used against us; the elimination of certain prominent figures in British intelligence most involved in this war. Or sending some kind of signal to the Americans — roughly in the Iranian style: if we cannot reach them directly, we must make them feel real pain. And not secretly, but openly: sending divers to cut underwater cables in the Baltic Sea leading to the Baltics, followed by an incursion onto their territory.
Are they afraid to direct missiles at the Museum of the Defense of Sevastopol? No, they are not. Why? Because they feel they are playing alone. Only they are playing this game of escalation. We are only taking limited, predictably weaker retaliatory steps to convince everyone — ourselves and them — that we are not seriously playing. We are not turning on full escalation. Meanwhile, everyone understands — and most importantly, the President understands — that the British stood behind the strike on the Sevastopol panorama museum. They directed the missile, American reconnaissance satellites plotted the route, and they pushed the button. Ukraine had nothing to do with it.
Our President sees this. And when he sees it and does not respond, they draw the conclusion: fine, everything is clear — the Russians will continue playing at de-escalation, while we will continue playing at escalation, because it costs us nothing. We erase their red lines; they draw new ones — we erase those too. And nothing happens to us.
This is already beginning to resemble Gorbachev’s time. We said: we will no longer fight the West or the Western system; we are reaching out to you with an open hand. And into that outstretched hand they placed a grenade with the pin pulled: they destroyed our power in Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact, then broke up the Soviet Union and began dismembering the Russian Federation — from which only Putin saved us. We were on the verge of the next cascade of consequences after unilaterally ending the Cold War. And to “end” the Cold War in their language means only one thing: to lose it.
The same thing is repeating now at the level of escalation. They say: we are escalating with you. And we reply: we are not escalating with you.
It seems to me that the limits of this position have been exhausted. We have demonstrated our peacefulness, goodwill, readiness for mutual understanding, for certain concessions, and for normalizing relations more than enough. Our President went to Anchorage; we talked with the Americans and explained everything; we are ready to engage with the European Union. But they are not ready and will not be ready — that is the problem.
They will not be ready until something truly convincing happens. For example — I am only speculating — one day we wake up and the military and political leadership of Kiev is gone. Some other people appear, running around in panic. And the second tier of leadership is gone too. At that point they will truly say: perhaps we should negotiate, otherwise the Russians will keep going. Then they will be ready to talk. And if we feel confident, we may choose not to negotiate and continue — or we may agree. Other scenarios are also possible.
I am not a military specialist. Everyone loves to give advice these days: people from the sidelines tell the army and the President what to do. I do not count myself among them — I am simply speculating. I am only applying the lessons of the past, or for example the experience of Iran in its confrontation, to our situation. Iran cannot defeat the United States and Israel, but it can inflict unacceptable damage on them — economic damage, for instance. That is what Iran does. And we too can inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy in many different ways.
We say: escalation is inevitable — and we are joining it. You raise the dial — and we, for example, raise it even higher. But it is not enough to just say this. It is obvious that they no longer react to our statements: all our protests and all our new red lines are perceived by them as white noise. It is also obvious that they treat words not followed by actions so serious they cannot be ignored with extreme frivolity.
We now face a very serious question. Some, like Karaganov, say we need to deliver a preventive strategic nuclear strike — for example, against the United States or the European Union. Others suggest using tactical nuclear weapons. As I understand it, this might once have been feasible, but today it is no longer the most relevant option. What is needed now is a set of complex, multidimensional, carefully planned actions carried out simultaneously across many domains. Perhaps something in space — for example, the destruction of the entire satellite reconnaissance system, since it constitutes one of our main problems. Perhaps other actions that no one expects from us. And all at once: one, two, three. If and when we manage to create six or seven such unpredictable, untrackable centers of real confrontation, that could stop them.
If we simply keep repeating “Enough, enough, enough — stop shelling our museums, leave our children alone, stop killing our schoolchildren, stop blowing up our trains, leave our oil refineries and even more important facilities alone,” no one will listen.
Host: Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], perhaps alongside these escalatory mechanisms, some preparation is already underway to ready our society and our future adult citizens for this changing world. I’m thinking, for example, of the recent changes to the history textbooks. There are so many topics to discuss, but I’d like to touch on this one too. Regarding the new edition of the unified history textbook series — in your view, is the goal of these changes what I just mentioned, or is a more comprehensive task being set?
Alexander Dugin: You see, we have grown too accustomed to peacetime rhetoric: “I agree with you, but not entirely,” “let’s discuss the details,” “let’s not discuss the details.”
The new textbooks — especially the history ones — are necessary to raise genuine, fully formed Russian patriots and to place patriotism at the center of our historical self-awareness. Yes, we need new citizens who will be proud of their Motherland, who will sincerely love Russia, know its history, understand its identity, know its heroes — and know its enemies. This is the primary task that the new series of textbooks is designed to accomplish: to instill in our children civic consciousness, a sense of dignity, patriotism, love for the Motherland, and an understanding of historical patterns.
I am, of course, deeply moved and immensely grateful to the authors for including in one of these textbooks the tragic fate of my daughter, Darya Dugina. People should know those who suffered for the Fatherland, those who gave their lives for the Motherland. It is on such images and examples — including Vladlen Tatarsky and the new heroes of the Special Military Operation and our war with the West — that we must raise the next generation.
Naturally, all generations matter — our grandfathers and great-grandfathers who built and defended our country. But the heroes who live among us are also important — people just like us: young men and women who today exemplify heroism, self-sacrifice, courage, intelligence, service to the Fatherland, love for the Motherland, loyalty to the Christian Church, our civilization, and our identity. They too belong in this textbook — and they have been included.
Here is what I want to say: some good deeds require no “buts,” no reservations like “it could have been done better.” It can always be done better — we will continue working on that. But the main thing is to do what is necessary: to restore dignity, pride, and love for the Fatherland in our schools, at the very foundation of our education.
We are doing the same thing, by the way, at the level of higher education — in universities and institutes. At the Ivan Ilyin Higher Political School, we teach courses in “Western studies” (Westernology), treating the West as a different civilization. We offer courses affirming that Russia is a state-civilization, courses on multipolarity, and courses on identity. We have set ourselves an ambitious goal: to rebuild the entire humanities education and the entire field of humanitarian scholarship on this patriotic foundation.
Unfortunately, the overall situation is still different. But the struggle for our children is the most important thing, and in schools this task has already been addressed. Work continues in other areas. A great deal has already been done through the course “Foundations of Russian Statehood,” which provides a certain inoculation of patriotism in universities. We must continue, develop, and expand this direction — broaden the field of Western studies, change the paradigms in the humanities based on the thesis repeatedly articulated by our President: Russia is a state-civilization. We live in a multipolar world where, alongside the West, there are other centers of power and other civilizations, including our own.
This restructuring of the entire humanitarian approach, of education and upbringing as a whole, is now underway at full speed — but “full speed” only by peacetime standards, or by the standards of a Special Military Operation. By the standards of a war with the West, this pace is still insufficient. While the situation with school history is good, in higher education things are moving in the right direction — the correct instructions have been given — but far too slowly, because there is enormous resistance. Some resist out of inertia, others for ideological reasons. This is the sixth column — opponents of the idea that Russia is a distinct civilization.
After all, Russophobia did not appear by accident, and not just in recent years. That said, we cannot reduce everything to spy networks, even though serious work has been done in that area. For the last 30–40 years, our enemies have simply been operating in the humanitarian sphere — centers that distorted the consciousness of our scholars, altered the educational process, promoted toxic trends in the humanities, and supported them. All of this exists. But the issue cannot be reduced to espionage alone. Even if we identify the entire network of Western agents of influence in the humanities, it will not be enough, because an entire generation of teachers and scholars has already been trained to view the West as universal. This is what we must fight against.
Therefore, the war that we are discussing today — and that Peskov spoke about — naturally affects all spheres of our society, including school education and, I believe, even preschool education. “Lessons about the most important things” should be conducted even for the youngest children. Let them sit on their potties and listen to stories about great heroes — then they will come to school already with the first seeds of civic consciousness.
We must shift our society into a different, awakened state — a state of affirming the distinctiveness, independence, and uniqueness of our civilization, which we are called upon to defend. It is precisely they — today’s youth, schoolchildren, and even kindergarten children — who will be called upon to protect and uphold our civilizational sovereignty, our dignity, our freedom, and our independence in the face of very serious challenges, including technological ones.
And if we are making this turn — and we can no longer avoid making it, because all the deadlines for dodging a serious civilizational conflict with the West have passed — then we must act quickly. Changing course, shifting the direction of this great ship from mere political sovereignty to full civilizational sovereignty is, of course, extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the helm must be turned — with a loud creak, because we need to change the course of an entire continent, and its inertia is enormous. This inertia comes not only from the last 30–40 years, but from the Petrine era: the West has long attracted and pulled us toward itself. Now a rather sharp break is required. We have been capable of such turns before — in the 19th and 20th centuries. But now we need another patriotic turn. It will be incredibly difficult to carry out, yet it must be done quickly.
Host: Literally within how many years? After all, when we talk about civilization, we usually think in terms of centuries. But if it has to be fast, how long is that?
Alexander Dugin: I cannot give an exact number. One thing is clear: the longer we delay, the worse our starting conditions become. The earlier we had declared that we are in a state of war with the West, the better the results we would already have. But better late than never. I won’t venture to say exactly how many years. We don’t have much time. I think we are talking about years, not decades — even though civilizations operate on much longer cycles. In that sense you are right. However, right now a paradigm shift is taking place, including in education.»
